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Cryptosporidium Oocysts in a 
Water Supply Associated with a 
Cryptosporidiosis Outbreak
Andrew D. Howe,* Sue Forster,* Stephen Morton,* Roberta Marshall,* 
Keith S. Osborn,† Peter Wright,‡ and Paul R. Hunter§ 
An outbreak of cryptosporidiosis occurred in and around Clitheroe, Lancashire, in northwest England, dur-
ing March 2000. Fifty-eight cases of diarrhea with Cryptosporidium identified in stool specimens were
reported. Cryptosporidium oocysts were identified in samples from the water treatment works as well as
domestic taps. Descriptive epidemiology suggested that drinking unboiled tap water in a single water zone
was the common factor linking  cases. Environmental investigation suggested that contamination with ani-
mal feces was the likely source of the outbreak. This outbreak was unusual in that hydrodynamic modeling
was used to give a good estimate of the peak oocyst count at the time of the contamination incident. The
oocysts’ persistence in the water distribution system after switching to another water source was also
unusual. This persistence may have been due to oocysts being entrapped within biofilm. Despite the con-
tinued presence of oocysts, epidemiologic evidence suggested that no one became ill after the water
source was changed. 
utbreaks of cryptosporidiosis associated with drinking
water have been an emerging problem for the past 20
years. In the 1990s, cryptosporidiosis became the most com-
mon cause of outbreaks associated with public drinking water
supplies in the United Kingdom (1). This disease is also
responsible for several of the largest outbreaks of waterborne
disease seen in the United States (1). Yet substantial areas of
uncertainty over many aspects of the epidemiology of this
infection remain. One of the most pressing such areas is deter-
mining what concentration of oocysts in drinking water is con-
sidered safe. 
In the United Kingdom, recent legislation was enacted that
set a legal limit of 1 oocyst/10 L when water was sampled con-
tinuously over a 24-hour period (2). However, this level was
set as a treatment standard and was not derived from known
public health standards. With current knowledge, proposing
standards for cryptosporidia based on public health criteria is
not possible, primarily because published reports of outbreaks
have not had accurate measures of the concentration of oocysts
in the water at the time when infection was thought to have
occurred. We report, to our knowledge, the first outbreak to
have occurred when a fairly accurate estimate of the concen-
tration of oocysts in the water could be made. 
The Outbreak
In March 2000, an outbreak of cryptosporidiosis occurred
in and around the town of Clitheroe in Lancashire County in
northwest England. This small market town, nestled in the
hills near the Ribble River, is a thriving community that
attracts many tourists. The surrounding countryside supports
arable and dairy farming. Before this outbreak, reported cases
of cryptosporidiosis were low. In the years 1997–1999, the
mean annual attack rate of laboratory-confirmed cryptosporid-
iosis was 4.83 per 10,000 residents per year, compared with
13.57 for the region as a whole.
During March 1–15, 2000, the Ribble Valley Environmen-
tal Health Department reported nine cases of cryptosporidiosis
to the East Lancashire Health Authority. All the patients lived
in or near Clitheroe. Provisional information provided by the
water company indicated that six of these nine patients lived in
a single water zone supplied by the same water treatment
works. On the basis of this information, an outbreak was
declared, and an outbreak control team was established. The
team met for the first time on March 16.
Methods
Epidemiologic Investigation
Environmental health and public health department person-
nel interviewed patients with cryptosporidiosis in person or by
telephone, using a structured questionnaire (3). Analysis was
performed by using the computer program Epi-Info (version
6.02; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta,
GA). Patients were defined as those with a positive stool sam-
ple who lived in or visited the implicated water zone and who
had onset of diarrhea since March 1, 2000. Cases were defined
as primary when no other member of the household had had
diarrhea in the 2 weeks before the onset of symptoms; possible
secondary cases were defined as those in which a member of
the same household had had diarrhea in the previous 2 weeks.
The case definitions included those who had traveled abroad
for <7 days. 
*East Lancashire Health Authority, Nelson, United Kingdom; †United
Utilities Water PLC, Warrington, United Kingdom; ‡Public Health Labo-




620 Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 8, No. 6, June 2002
Microbiologic Investigation
General practitioners in the area submitted stool samples
to the local hospital microbiology laboratory. Stools were
examined by microscopy with the modified auramine phenol
stain (4). Positive samples were then sent to the Public
Health Laboratory Service’s Cryptosporidium Reference
Unit for genotyping. 
Environmental Investigations
The local water company provided information on the
water supply, instituted a water-sampling schedule (from
domestic properties, water treatment works, and fire hydrants
during flushing operations), and analyzed the water samples to
identify Cryptosporidium oocysts. Most of the samples were
10-L grab samples analyzed according to the U.K. standard
method (5). The large-volume samples were analyzed by the
method in the Water Supply (Water Quality) Amendment Reg-
ulations of 1999 (2). The source of water to the affected area
(Grindleton Springs) was visited by members of the outbreak
control team.
The local water company supplied rainfall statistics for the
weeks preceding the outbreak. Local authority engineers were
consulted for information on previous high water or flood
warnings. 
After the incident, the water company constructed a physi-
cal model of the affected reservoir, Lowcocks, with a geomet-
ric scaling ratio of 32:1. Flows were tracked by using salt
injection with an array of conductivity probes suspended
above the tank and injecting colored dyes for visualization. As
the ratio of the two respective inlet flows can vary, the baseline
performance of the tank was evaluated over a range of opera-
tional, but steady state, conditions. A series of transient tests
was then conducted to mirror the operation of the reservoir in
the time leading up to and covering the incident until the boil
water notice was issued on March 21. 
Result
Descriptive Epidemiology
Fifty-eight cases met the case definition. Of these, three
were in patients who had traveled abroad for <7 days in the 2
weeks before illness. Fifty-one cases were identified as pri-
mary, and seven as possible secondary. The dates of onset of
cases (Figure 1) showed peaks on March 10 and 17. Ages of
patients ranged from 7 months to 95 years, but most patients
were <5 years (52%). Thirty (52%) of the patients were male
and 28 (48%) female. All 58 patients (100%) had diarrhea; 18
(31%) had fever, 48 (83%) abdominal pain, 19 (33%) vomit-
ing, and three (5%) blood in the stool. 
Fifty-one patients lived in the same water supply zone and
drank unboiled main tap water in the zone. The crude attack
rate for residents of this zone was 29.6 per 10,000 population
(based on general practitioner registered population of 17,252
linked by postal code of residences in the water supply zone).
The crude attack rate for people within the same local govern-
ment area but not living in the same water supply zone was 1.8
per 10,000 population, giving a relative risk associated with
residence in the implicated water supply zone of 16.2 (95%
confidence interval 7.5 to 35.0). The age-specific attack rate
varied from 275 per 10,000 in children <5 years of age to 5.6
per 10,000 in those >44 years (Table 1). Seven patients lived in
properties not in the affected water zone. However, six of these
had drunk unboiled main water in the affected zone in the 2
weeks before illness; the other patient had visited a swimming
pool in the zone. Other potential risk factors, such as travel,
visit to a swimming pool, and consumption of certain foods,
were included in the questionnaire. None was common in
patients.
Microbiologic Testing
Of the 58 cases with a positive stool sample for Cryptospo-
ridium, 47 specimens were typed. All were C. parvum geno-




Lowcocks Water Treatment Works (WTW), sourced from
Grindleton Springs, supplied approximately 90% of the water
to the affected zone. The supply was a spring source that fed a
single service reservoir and from there moved into distribu-
tion. However, the reservoir could also be filled from a nearby
larger water supply via an aqueduct. The supply was chlori-
nated but not filtered. As part of the risk assessment carried
out under water quality amendment regulations (2), Lowcocks
Figure 1. Date of diarrhea onset, 58 cryptosporidiosis cases, 
Clitheroe, 2000. 
Table 1. Age-specific attack rates for cryptosporidiosis in residents of 






<4 26 945 275.1 170.8 to 379.4
5–14 9 2,283 39.4 13.7 to 65.1
15–44 12 6,822 17.6 7.6 to 27.5
>45 4 7,202 5.6 0.1 to 11.0
Total 51 1,7252 29.6 21.5 to 37.7
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WTW was classified as being at “significant risk” from
Cryptosporidium oocysts in water supplied from the works.
However, continuous monitoring had not yet begun before the
outbreak. 
The reservoir is rectangular with two inlets and a single
outlet. The tank is 110 m long and 90 m wide with an opera-
tional depth between 3.5 m and 5.4 m. The spring has one
inlet, which varies from 2 to 6 megaliters per day and another
from the aqueduct, which varies from 1.5 to 5 megaliters per
day. The calculated capacity of the reservoir is 53 megaliters.
The ratio of aqueduct to spring water varies considerably dur-
ing normal operation; full advantage is taken of the increase in
availability of the spring’s source after major rainfalls. 
On March 17, a large-volume sample of water (1,627 L)
from a pumping station fed from Lowcocks WTW yielded 76
oocysts of Cryptosporidium per 1,000 L. Cryptosporidium
oocysts were also identified in a water sample taken from a
domestic tap in the water zone on March 16 at a concentration
of five oocysts per 10 L of water. From March 16 to April 6, a
total of 192 samples (10-L grab samples) from domestic taps
or fire hydrants in the affected zone were analyzed; 47 (24%)
contained Cryptosporidium oocysts in concentrations ranging
from 1 to 9/10 L. Six water samples from domestic taps in
areas adjoining the affected water zone were negative (Table 2,
Figure 2).
Site Visits
The concrete casings of two of the Grindleton Springs col-
lection chambers showed signs of aging and were in a poor
state of repair (one could look directly into one chamber
through holes in the concrete). Evidence of recent livestock
excreta (cattle) was present in the areas around, and in direct
contact with, the covers to several of the spring collection
chambers; manure was also spread in a field within 5 m of one
wellhead.
Rainfall Statistics
Abnormally heavy rainfall (up to 58 mm per day) and
flood alerts were reported for the area on February 27 and
March 2–7.
Hydraulic Modeling
A number of detailed transient state tests were conducted
in which the flows and levels were altered in line with the res-
ervoir operation before and during the outbreak. Initially, the
first “injection” of oocysts was assumed to have come into the
reservoir on February 27, after the first associated heavy rain-
fall. However, results from these initial tests indicated that,
because of the way the reservoir operated and its short nominal
retention time (2 days) during part of this period, a large spike
of oocysts entering the reservoir from the springs inlet on Feb-
ruary 27 would have been effectively washed out by the time
the sample was taken on March 17.
Two potential contamination events, one after each major
rainfall event on February 27 and March 2, respectively, were
then proposed. This hypothesis was modeled by injection of
two discrete salt pulses into the model springs inlet at the
appropriately scaled time in the modeling run. Results indi-
cated three peaks of oocyst counts at the tank outlet. The first
peak occurred when the tank was operating on only spring
flow, corresponding to February 29. The second peak came on
March 1, when aqueduct flow was introduced. The final peak
occurred on March 2–3, after the second salt pulse (simulating
the rainfall incident). 
Based on the concentration found in the March 17 sample,
the most probable peak concentration that the Clitheroe popu-
lation would have been exposed to was 40 times greater,
approximately 30 oocysts per 10 L. These values are based on
tests in which the pulse was introduced instantaneously; in
practice, contamination likely took place over several hours or
days after each major rainfall event. While it is likely that the
behavior of oocysts would not substantially differ in the water
system and the salt and dye model, these numbers should not
be considered exact; rather, they are a good indication of level
of exposure over the period in question.
Table 2. Results of 10-L grab samples taken within distribution range 
of water works during investigationa of cryptosporidial outbreak, 





positive Oocyst counts of positive samples/L
16 Mar 3 1 0.5
17 Mar 6 5 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1
18 Mar 8 4 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3
19 Mar 8 5 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.2
20 Mar 9 5 0.1 0.2 0.9 0.5 0.1
21 Mar 23 5 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.1
22 Mar 16 4 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
23 Mar 15 2 0.1 0.2
24 Mar 15 2 0.1 0.1
25 Mar 12 2 0.1 0.1
26 Mar 12 0
27 Mar 9 0
28 Mar 3 2 0.3 0.4
29 Mar 3 0
30 Mar 6 3 0.1 0.2 0.4
31 Mar 9 3 0.1 0.1 0.6
1 Apr 7 1 0.1
2 Apr 7 1 0.1
3 Apr 6 2 0.1 0.1
4 Apr 6 0
5 Apr 6 0
6 Apr 3 0
a Total volume examined each day (in L) = 10 X number of samples taken.
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Control Measures
At the first outbreak control team meeting, 11 of 14
reported cryptosporidiosis cases were known to be in residents
of the same water supply zone. As a result, the water supply to
the affected area was changed to an alternate supply during the
following night, and the system was flushed. The alternate
supply was an approximately 50/50 blend of filtered surface
water from two separate (protected) upland impounding reser-
voirs. The first source (Watchgate) provides up to 600 megali-
ters per day to a population of approximately 1.75 x 106; the
second source (Hodder) provides up to 50 megaliters per day
to a population of approximately 1.75 x 103. Both areas had
had no observed increase in the rates of reported cryptosporid-
iosis.
At the third outbreak control team meeting, when results of
sampling became available, it became evident that, although
the water supply to the area had been changed by 9:30 a.m. on
March 17 (and its distribution throughout the zone confirmed
by chemical analysis of domestic water samples), substantial
numbers of Cryptosporidium oocysts still existed in samples
taken during the next 4 days (March 17–20). Initial samples
from the source of the new water supply showed no evidence
of contamination. Historic archived data available for both
new sources showed only a low frequency of detected oocysts
in the raw (untreated source) water for each site. During the
incident, five samples of treated water were taken from the
first site and 13 samples from the second source. A single
oocyst was reported in one 10-L sample taken from the first
site; no oocysts were detected in the other samples. 
The outbreak control team agreed that there continued to
be a risk to public health and issued a “Boil Water Advisory”
on March 21. This advisory was rescinded on March 27 after
extensive water system flushing operations and 2 days of
domestic water samples being clear of Cryptosporidium
oocysts. The peak in counts on March 28, although calculated
from three samples, was associated with the sampling water
from hydrants rather than from domestic taps. 
Water sampling continued, but samples were taken from
fire hydrants rather than domestic taps. While inspections of
the water system showed no evidence of ongoing contamina-
tion, analysis of water continued to show cryptosporidia.
When oocysts were detected in hydrant samples after the
source of water had been changed, experienced operations
staff inspected the route of the aqueduct, and boundary valves
at the periphery of the affected distribution system were
checked to ensure that water could not enter this system from
an adjacent zone. 
At this stage, no further new cases of cryptosporidiosis
were being reported. The original source of water, Grindleton
Springs, had been identified as having a plausible source of
oocysts within the watershed (cattle excreta), a plausible path-
way (through the damaged spring head structure to one of the
chambers), and inadequate treatment for removing oocysts
(microfiltration with a pore size >40 µ); this source of water
had been isolated and discharged to waste. Thus, the change in
sampling method, rather than ongoing contamination, might
be causing the continuing positive oocyst results. For this rea-
son, the boil water advisory was not reinstituted. Further flush-
ing continued, no new cases of cryptosporidiosis were
reported, and the last water sample positive for oocysts was on
April 3. 
Discussion
Use of U.K. Public Health Laboratory Service guidelines
strongly associated this outbreak with the water supply
because Cryptosporidium oocysts were detected in treated
water and the descriptive epidemiology suggested that drink-
ing tap water was the only common factor linking the cases
(6). Environmental investigations suggested that contamina-
tion of Grindleton Springs with animal feces was the probable
cause of the outbreak. Results of genotyping were consistent
with an animal source.
This outbreak is unusual because of the very high attack
rate of laboratory-confirmed cases. The crude attack rate for
microbiologically confirmed cases of cryptosporidiosis was
much higher than previously reported in the United Kingdom
(7–9). We suggest that this high attack rate occurred because
of low immunity in the population and the probable high con-
centration of oocysts at the time of the initial contamination.
Although we have no direct measure of population immunity
before this outbreak, the incidence of infection in previous
years was low compared with that in the rest of the region.
Furthermore, until the outbreak, the water supply was a
groundwater source; various groups have suggested that such
sources are associated with lower sporadic infections and
lower population immunity (7,10). 
The other major issue raised by this outbreak was the
impact of changing the source of water. The outbreak control
team had suggested that changing the water supply to the
affected area at the beginning of the outbreak would remove
the Cryptosporidium oocysts from the water. However, this
measure did not result in the expected immediate clearance of
contamination. Indeed, despite lack of evidence of a new con-
tamination source and with ongoing extensive flushing opera-
tions, oocysts remained detectable at low levels for up to 19
days after the change. Counts did generally decline during the
10 days after the supply was changed; however, counts peaked
on March 20 after a burst in the main supply pipe. Increased
Figure 2. Mean daily cryptosporidia oocyst counts from 10-L grab 
samples taken during outbreak investigation, Clitheroe.
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counts on March 28–31 occurred when water samples started
being taken from hydrants, rather than domestic taps. Hydrant
water is discharged much more forcefully than that from
domestic taps. The slow decline in oocyst counts after the
change in supply may have been because of captured oocysts
being released from the biofilm on the surface of the distribu-
tion pipes. Subsequent peaks associated with the burst and use
of hydrants for sampling could have increased oocyst counts
by stripping biofilm from the inner surface. Cryptosporidium
oocysts do attach to biofilm in this manner (1,11,12)
Whatever the reasons for the continued detection of
oocysts in water samples, few, if any, cases of infection were
acquired after the source was changed. The epidemiologic
analysis suggests that changing the water supply was the key
public health measure. The boil-water advisory had little, if
any, effect on reducing subsequent cases. The decision not to
reintroduce the advisory when hydrant samples continued to
show oocysts appears to have been justified.
Monitoring water samples, particularly with 10-L small-
volume samples, highlighted the difficulties in interpreting the
public health importance of oocysts in the water (13–15). Cur-
rently, the level of detectable Cryptosporidium oocysts in
domestic water samples that poses no public health risk is
unknown. The number of oocysts detected in the large-volume
filtration of water from the WTW was below the limit cur-
rently defined as a national maximum permissible treatment
standard (100 oocysts per 1,000 L) (2). However, this outbreak
occurred 10 days after the most recent of three major rainfalls
that could plausibly have given rise to contamination of the
source water. Physical and computational fluid dynamics mod-
eling suggested that the concentrations of oocysts in water
leaving the WTW immediately after the heavy rainfall were 30
times the statutory treatment standard. 
The introduction of continuous monitoring in the United
Kingdom, together with existing surveillance for cryptosporid-
ium infection in humans, will hopefully result in a better defi-
nition of an appropriate public health standard for this
organism. However, recent human studies have shown a sub-
stantial intraspecies variability in the infectivity of Cryptospo-
ridium oocysts (16). Furthermore, we have recently identified
a novel strain of C. parvum that appears to be widespread in
sheep but has never been described in humans (17). These
observations suggest that identifying a standard in drinking
water that would lead to a tolerable level of illness in the com-
munity may not be possible. Indeed, outbreaks of cryptospo-
ridiosis associated with drinking water elsewhere in the United
Kingdom have occurred despite the peak oocyst count’s being
well within the statutory standard (18,19). Several episodes
have also been reported in which high oocyst counts (>10
oocysts in 100 L) have been detected in treated water with no
episodes of illness subsequently being detected in the commu-
nity (20).
Further research is required to define the public health
importance of low levels of Cryptosporidium oocysts as well
as the optimal water sampling strategy during an outbreak.
Similarly, the effectiveness and utility of system flushing
remain to be shown. The current treatment standard should be
reviewed, as further evidence relating to the public health
impact of levels of Cryptosporidium oocysts becomes avail-
able. 
Dr. Howe is a specialist registrar in public health medicine in
northwest England. In addition to health protection and waterborne
disease, his research interests include the public health response to
violence.
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